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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LOISCROWDER, ) 
Plaintiff and ] 
Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, ] 
a body politic, ] 
Defendant and .] 
Appellant, ] 
and JOHN DOES I 
through X, • ] 
Defendants. ] 
* 
I Case No. 14405 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action against appellant for personal injury to 
respondent resulting from an autanobile accident occurring in Salt 
Lake County. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss respondent's Complaint 
on the ground that respondent failed to file a notice of claim with 
appellant within the ninety days provided for in the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 (1967)). The respondent 
filed an Amended Con plaint in which she admitted that notice was 
not given the appellant county within the time provided, but in so amending, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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{ 
claimed that the notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act are unconstitutional as they do not afford due process and equal 
protection of the law. 
The tr ial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and issued a 
Memorandum Decision declaring that the ninety day notice require-
ment violates equal protection and due process of law, and is unconsti-
tutional. > < 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the trial court 's Order 
denying appellant's Motion to Dismiss. 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts as set forth in ^ 
appellant's brief. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I ' 
THERE EXISTS NO RATIONAL OR REASON-
ABLE BASIS FOR DIFFERING NOTICE 
REQUIREMENTS AS IMPOSED BY UTAH 
STATUTES INVOLVING GOVERNMENTAL 
ENTITIES. 
• • * 
The State of Utah has waived its sovereign immunity to allow 
actions against it and its political subdivisions for torts committed < 
by the state, counties, municipalities and governmental entities against 
2 
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the citizens of this State. In so doing, the State has established 
varying times within which notice of a claim must be filed against 
the State of Utah, a political subdivision, a city or incorporated town. 
Absent filing of such claim within the time specified, actions against 
the State, its political subdivisions, cities and towns are barred. 
The notice provisions require that claims must be filed 
against the State of Utah within one year after the cause of action 
arises. * Claims against other governmental entities, including 
counties, must be filed within 90 days after the cause of action arises, 
and claims against cities and incorporated towns must be filed with-
in six months. 
1. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 (1967): A claim against the state or 
any agency thereof as defined herein shall be forever barred 
unless notice thereof is filed with the attorney general of the 
State of Utah and the agency concerned within one year after 
the cause of action arises. 
2. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13(1967): A claim against a political 
subdivision shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is 
filed within ninety days after the cause of action a r i s e s . . . 
3. Utah Code Ann. §10-7-77 (1967): Every claim against a city 
or incorporation town for damages or injury, alleged to have 
been caused by the defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed 
condition of any street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert 
or bridge of such city or town, or from the negligence of 
the city or town authorities in respect to any such street, 
alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge, shall within 
six months after the happening of such injury or damage be 
presented to the board of commissioners or city council of 
such city, or board of trustees of such town, . . . 
-3-
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i 
In the event such claims are rejected, legal action must be initiated 
within one year after notification of the rejection or presumed denial 
by inaction on the part of the governmental entity. 
Fundamental to the basic issue in this case is a determina-
tion of the existence of an appropriate governmental interest suitably < 
furthered by the differential treatment and differing notice require-
ment as imposed by existing State statutes. Absent a showing of the 
i 
existence of such overriding governmental interest, the legislation 
must be striken as a denial of equal protection as guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,
 ( 
406 U.S. 164(1972). 
Although discrimination between classes of citizens has 
been upheld as not violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution, such legislation has only been upheld 
where the classification has been deemed to be reasonable and have 
some rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective. 
Respondent asserts that the classifications and differences 
existing in the Utah notice statutes are wholly irrelevant to the purpose 
of the statutes and legislative objective in waiving governmental im-
munities in certain instances, and that there exists no reasonable 
justification for such differing notice periods. 
-4-
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The Utah statutes waiving sovereign immunity of the State, 
its political subdivisions, incorporated towns and cities, is a law of 
general application throughout the State of Utah and is a matter of 
State-wide interest and concern. Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution provides: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
It is apparent that the differing notice requirements as provided in 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12, §63-30-13 and §10-7-77 are not unifoim 
in their operation. 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution forbids any state to "deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. " As stated in Toronto v. 
Sheffield, 118 Utah 460.222 Pac. 2d 594 (1950): 
fUnder these provisions in State v. Mason, 
94 Utah 501, at page 507, and 78 P. 2d 920, 
at page 923 and 117 A. L. R. 330 through 
Mr. Justice Wolfe, we said: "Of course, 
every legislative act is in one sense dis-
criminatory. The Legislature cannot [in 
one act] legislate as to all persons or all 
subject matters. It is inclusive as to some 
class or group and as to some human rela-
tionships, transactions or functions and ex-
clusive as to the remainder. For that rea-
son, to be unconstitutional the discrimina-
tion must be unreasonable or arbitrary. 
A classification is never unreasonable or 
arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion 
-5 -
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features so long as there is some basis for 
the differentiation between classes or sub- . 
ject matters included as compared to those 
excluded from its operation, provided the 
differentiation bears a reasonable relation 
to the purposes to be accomplished by the 
act ." , 
To the same effect see Gronlund v. 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 194 P. 2d 464; 
Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 
P. 2d 939; State v. Walker, 100 Utah 523, 
116 P.2d 766; State v. Sopher, 25 Utah * 
318, 71 P. 482, 60 L.R.A. 468, 95 Am. 
St. Rep. 845. 
222 Pac. 2d at 599. 
i 
Appellant argues that these differentiations between classes and sub-
ject matters mentioned above are founded in the beneficial effect of 
giving governmental entities an opportunity to settle meritous claims i 
prior to the institution of litigation; that they provide an opportunity 
to investigate the claims at the earliest opportunity; and further, 
I 
that they allow the entity to anticipate, in a fiscal sense, the payment 
of claims along with granting an opportunity to make proper repairs 
of dangerous defects. The appellant further argues that the notice < 
statutes give the added benefit of facilitating the orderly and 
expedious administration of public business. The respondent, on 
the other hand, argues to this Court that the interests of the State 
of Utah, with a substantially longer notice period, are as direct and 
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immediate in avoiding needless litigation; are as involved with a 
prompt investigation of claims; and find it as desirable fiscally and 
from the standpoint of the elemination of defects as those interests 
of the county government. It may well be said that all governmental 
entities share equally in these stated goals. However, by virtue of 
the fact that the respondent herein collided with a bridge owned by 
Salt Lake County, the applicable notice period is dramatically less 
than would have obtained had she collided with a bridge owned by 
Salt Lake City (six months) or the State of Utah (one year). 
The appellant suggests that a shorter notice of claim period 
is required by Salt Lake County than is required by the State or a 
municipality since there may be no other way for city or county 
personnel promptly to discover and correct defective conditions. 
Respondent, however, suggests that the investigative ability of 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office in connection with automobile 
accidents and the activities of insurance investigators of the liability, 
insurance carrier of Salt Lake County adequately enables appellant 
conveniently and promptly to become aware of potential claims 
involving appellant county and to transmit to appropriate county 
departments the existence of any unsafe or defective road or high-
way conditions, bridges, etc. In reality, appellant is better prepared 
and equipped to investigate and defend negligence actions than are 
-7-
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^ 
most private tortfeasors to whom no special notice privilege has been 
granted by the Legislature. Grubaugh v. St. Johns, 384 Mich. 165, 
180 N. W. 2d 778, 44 A. R.L. 3d 1095 (1970). That appellant's need < 
for a shorter notice period than that of the State of Utah or an incorpora-
ted town or city is not apparent from the notice statutes. Appellant 
assumes a legislative purpose and history not evident from the record 
of this case in its suggestions at pages 8-12 of appellant's brief that 
the Legislature took into account certain facts regarding geographical 
and population differences, differences in services, differences in 
budgeting and revenues and manpower, which facts are not in evidence 
in this case or part of the record hereof. 
The Nevada Supreme Court, in striking down the Nevada 
Revised Statutes requiring the filing of a notice of claim in a period 
shorter than the general statutes of limitation, stated in the case of 
Turnery. Staggs, 89 Nev, 230, 510 P. 2d 879 (1973); cert, den. 414 
U.S. 1079(1973): 
n[W]e believe that the notice of claim 
requirements found in NRS 244.245 and 
NRS 244.250 as applied to governmental 
torts deny equal protection guaranteed 
by the United States Constitution. With-
in our present scheme of government, 
claim statutes serve no real beneficial 
use . . .but they are indeed a trap for 
the unwary.,f 
Likewise, respondent urges that these diversified claim requirements 
vis-a-vis city, county and State are not founded on a reasonable classi-
fication. The result of such legislation has been, indeed, to trap 
- Q -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
this unwary respondent and, if the appellant prevails, deny to her 
the availability of our courts . 
Respondent suggests that in the interest of uniform applica-
tion of the law, that the notice requirements applicable to all govern-
mental entities be standardized and given a general application through-
out the State regardless of the type of governmental entity or political 
subdivision involved. The existing differences have no apparent 
relationship to any demonstrable legislative purpose. Respondent 
suggests that the notice requirement as applied to counties should 
be at least the minimum six month requirement imposed on incorpora-
ted towns and cit ies. To the extent that appellant's argument concern-
ing geographical distance and area has any mer i t in comparison of 
cit ies, towns, counties and the State, respondent suggests it would 
be more reasonable to provide a longer notice requirement applicable 
to counties and a shorter notice requirement to cities and towns. 
See generally, Far re l l , Delay in Notice of Tort Claims Against a 
Governmental Agency, 20 Cleveland State Law Review 23 (1971). 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE IN 
REVIEW OF IMPUGNED LEGISLATION 
AND DECLARE UTAH CODE ANNOTA-
TED §63-30-13 TO BE UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF THE FED-
ERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 
- 9 -
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This Court has the power to declare any act of any depart-
ment of government violative of the Federal or State constitutions to 
be utterly void, and in exercising this function in regard to an act 
of the Legislature it does not trench on the domain of the legislative 
branch of government. Ritchie v. Richards, 14 Utah 345, 47 Pac. 670 
(1896). 
Effective use of the court system of this State should not be 
needlessly complex. Rather, a simple basis for allowing a victim 
of governmental tort access to our courts should be the standard. 
Inconsistencies existing among statutes involving notice requirements 
should be resolved in favor of the injured citizen to allow plaintiff-
litigants maximum free access to our courts. This is consistent 
with our constitutional mandates and legislative history. 
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
"All courts shall be open and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be admini-
stered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from prose-
cuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
state, by himself or counsel, any civil cause 
to which he is a party." 
Notwithstanding the above-cited State Constitutional provision, the 
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
-10-
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United States prohibits the State from making or enforcing any law 
"which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.tT 
The notice of claim statutes operate in reality as a statute 
of limitations. Albert v. Deitz 283 Fed. Supp. 854 (D.Haw. 1968). 
Yet public policy expressed by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
is clearly in favor of allowing recovery to persons of this State 
injured by governmental tortfeasors. 
To uphold the validity of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 would 
effectively deprive respondent of her day in court, denying her 
access to the judicial system, which access historically has been 
equated to the "inalienable rights recognized by the United States 
Supreme CourtM. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-80, 
28 L.Ed. 2d 113, 91 S.Ct. 780(1971). 
It has been stated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Aim strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 35 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed. 
2d 62, 66(1965): 
fT[T]he right to a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard. . .must be protected against 
denial by particular laws that operate to 
jeopardize it for particular individuals.,f 
-11-
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The State of Utah cannot deny the plaintiff a reasonable 
opportunity to litigate plaintiff's action and prevent her access to 
the courts. It follows such access cannot be unreasonably constrained 
for a particular class of persons without violating the Equal 
Protection Clause, The so-called notice requirements have become 
traps for the unwary and exhibit no justification in the furtherance 
of any legitimate governmental or legislative purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
The differing notice requirements lack the constitutionally 
required standard of a rational classification and reasonable basis 
of legislative purpose. Further, they appear to be nothing more 
than an arbitrary exercise of legislative drafting in pursuit of no 
apparent legislative purpose, and certainly not the legitimate 
purposes required by the Federal and State constitutions. The 
thrust of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is to ameliorate the 
hardship caused by the now generally repudiated doctrine of "the 
king can do no wrong." 
By affirming the trial court's finding of the unconstitutionality 
of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13, this Court could further the purpose 
and spirit of the Utah Governmental Immunities Act and give to that 
-12-
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legislation the general application of the laws required by our 
State constitution. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RALDGCGUNDRY 
UM 
RY «<" 
•d£ . 
610 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
/tMtsujh'X MJ£*46C*-+tmJ\ 
WARREN M. WEGGEteAND 
560 South 300 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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-13-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent by mailing same, postage prepaid, 
respectively to Merlin R. Lybbert and Scott Daniels, 700 Continental 
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, Attorneys for 
Defendant-Appellant, this /^Tday of April, 1976. 
4^4^^ /A. i^Yft^^-A 
•14-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
